“Ouch!” That is the aim of deterrence. The adversary should feel that they have miscalculated. Their target was not intimidated. Instead, it responded with something effective and painful.
Russia (and other hostile states) have been testing deterrence in European and North American countries since the 1990s. Invading neighboring countries. Cyberattacks. Economic warfare. Interference in political systems. Arson. Sabotage. Murder. The list is long. But, the list of effective responses is very short. Nothing that Britain, the United States, France, Germany, or other big Western countries have done has produced the “ouch” in the Kremlin (or in Beijing, Tehran, or Pyongyang) that makes regimes in those countries think that they have seriously miscalculated. So they keep going.
Western decision-makers protest vehemently against the charge of ineffectiveness. They point to sanctions, expulsions, and an array of diplomatic, military, and other responses. Yes—all that happened. But has anything we done deterred further attacks? Clearly not, for they continue.
Even now, most Western countries will not leave their comfort zone. They will help Ukraine resist a full-scale military invasion, but not with enough money or weapons to guarantee victory. They will react to Russian attacks on their own soil, but only with performative sanctions: press releases, diplomatic expulsions, and economic sanctions that do not really hurt anyone.
The price for this timidity is paid most conspicuously by Ukraine. For now, Russian glide bombs, missiles, and rockets do not rain down on European cities. Germans return from their anti-war demonstrations to sleep peacefully in their own beds rather than camping in bomb shelters.
But Europe is under attack, too. The drones that buzzed Stockholm airport last week, the GPS jamming that interfered with Finnish civil aviation, the increased Russian military activity around undersea cables, and numerous cyberattacks (including some that are not made public) — all these are examples of Russian hybrid aggression that stretches far beyond Ukraine.
And there is no answer. What would Britain do, for example, if mysterious drones interfered with aviation at Heathrow airport? Airlines are easily scared. It is easy to imagine foreign operators deciding that it is safer to halt flights to London. The disruption and damage to the British economy would spiral.
What would Britain do? The arsenal looks thin. Britain’s nuclear weapons are useless. An angry press release and the expulsion of Russia’s remaining diplomats from London will not produce the “ouch” factor.
One option would be to react using Ukrainian capabilities. Provide the manufacturing, financial, and intelligence help needed to ensure that Ukrainian drones can do the same to Moscow’s airports. Another would be to ask allies to help. Imagine that Norway announces new restrictions on Russia’s presence in Svalbard, and at the same time, Finland says that technical difficulties will temporarily restrict the operation of Russia’s spy base (sorry: consulate) on the Åland islands. Meanwhile, European financial authorities would swoop on Russian-linked banks in Cyprus.
Even better would be if Britain moved out of its comfort zone and started dealing with the enablers: the bankers, lawyers, accountants, and other besuited accomplices who keep the wheels turning for the Kremlin’s sanctions-busting. Some of them are actually based in Britain, but rather more are in the United Arab Emirates and similar jurisdictions. If they thought they faced professional censure, civil liability, or criminal prosecution, the business-class seats on the Kremlin’s gravy train might suddenly look less attractive. The “ouch” effect would hit not just them but their clients in Moscow.
All this is possible. But it is still unlikely. Western countries care deeply about their own security. But not quite deeply enough. Russia knows that. We don’t.
Edward Lucas is a Non-resident Senior Fellow and Senior Advisor at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA).
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the position or views of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis.
From the Ashes: Cultural Identity and National Security in the Age of Conflict
Date: November 19, 2024
Time: 10:00 a.m. – 6:00 p.m. CT
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