Poles, along with their Baltic and Nordic neighbors, are increasingly impatient. They are frustrated by American dithering over Ukraine and the restraints it imposes on responding to Russian gray-zone attacks. They fear that Vladimir Putin’s regime or its successor will be ready for another war far earlier than most Westerners think. They are spending stonking amounts on defense and building a web of tight bilateral and multilateral ties in security, planning, intelligence, and procurement.
The contrast with countries further south is stark. Central Europeans are not just laggards. They are heading in the wrong direction. Austria’s election winner was the FPÖ of Herbert Kickl, who, as interior minister, made his country an intelligence pariah. Slovakia last year re-elected Robert Fico, a forthright critic of the Ukraine war and ally of Hungary’s veteran strongman Victor Orbán. The Czech government, admirably hawkish on foreign policy, is splintering and unpopular amid cost-of-living woes. The former prime minister and tycoon Andrej Babiš hopes for a comeback next year. Along with Fico and Orbán, Babiš is part of the new “Patriots for Europe” grouping, which opposes aid for Ukraine and blames the war on the West.
Not that the picture to the west is much cheerier. Pro-Putin parties of right and left have done well in recent regional elections in Germany. Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s coalition is increasingly dysfunctional. Its failure goes far beyond Russia. The China policy of Europe’s largest economy seems driven by short-term commercial considerations. Among the big countries’ leaders, only Italy’s Giorgia Meloni offers clarity and decisiveness.
The mess among the European Union’s member states places an even greater role on the new European Commission. The answer to the apocryphal question (wrongly attributed to Henry Kissinger), “Who do I call if I want to speak to Europe?” is clear: Commission President Ursula von der Leyen. The new team has been chosen but is not yet in place. Delaying hearings at the European Parliament until November looks self-indulgent. The world is on fire, and decisions were needed yesterday. EU dithering on enlargement, for example, is fuelling discontent across the candidate countries in south-eastern Europe. Russia and China make hay from that.
In short, the “Big Europe” of 30-plus countries, whether in NATO, the EU, or both, is unready to shoulder the burden of its own security. It lacks a strategic outlook: it has nothing to say about the Middle East, for example. National self-interest means its defense industries are fragmented. It fails to use its hefty development aid strategically in Asian, African, and Latin American countries, where anti-Israel and anti-American sentiment is running hot.
Nor is Europe yet capable of being a dependable ally for the United States. In theory, the deal should be obvious: help the Americans contain and constrain China in return for a continued US military guarantee to Europe. But too many Europeans flinch at the thought of being embroiled in a global confrontation with China. They would rather make money. And the US backstop in Europe looks alarmingly like a frontstop, placing too much cost and risk on the American side. Most military plans rely heavily on the assumption that the Americans will save the day.
Against that background, the Nordic-Polish-Baltic framework looks particularly important. These are allies with effective governments, strong economies, resilient societies, and capable militaries. Add a few more countries – Britain, the Netherlands, and Romania, say — and this new “minilateral” around the Baltic Sea looks increasingly promising.
One question is how quickly its existing military-focused cooperation can add political, diplomatic, and administrative heft. Another is whether it can withstand the Russian pressure that has been so successful elsewhere.
Edward Lucas is a Non-resident Senior Fellow and Senior Advisor at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA).
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the position or views of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis.
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